Efficiency of Divisionalization and Departmentalization on Corporate Returns with Regards to Transfer Pricing by Adesola, Fadenipo, Adenike et al.
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.11, 2016 
 
6 
Efficiency of Divisionalization and Departmentalization on 
Corporate Returns with Regards to Transfer Pricing 
 
Fadenipo, Adenike Adesola1      Sunday A. Effiong* 2      Okobe, Ebri 3      Ahonkhai, Ohimai Ebahi3 
1.Department Of Accounting, Faculty Of Management Sciences, University Of Calabar, Nigeria 
2.Department Of Accounting, Faculty Of Management Sciences, University Of Calabar, P. M. B. 1115 Calabar, 
Cross River State, Nigeria 
3.Department Of Accounting, Faculty Of Management Sciences, University Of Calabar, Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
The study was carried out to examine the effect of transfer pricing between divisions and departments on 
corporate returns. Data were gathered through questionnaire on the selected sample companies in Nigeria. The 
study found out that transferred prices relate to performance measurements in that they affect, and establish a 
ceiling on the amount of profit or markup that a division is able to generate on its products. It was equally 
established that divisionalisation encourages managers to be profit responsible. That is, it encourages 
responsibility for generation of revenues, cost control and  satisfactory returns on investment of capital in the 
operations of an organization. It was therefore recommended that high budgeted controllable profit target should 
be set if divisional mangers must make enough profit that will cover both their own operational cost and the 
corporate expenses. More so divisionalized companies should ensure that their divisional managers concentrate 
on increase of controllable profit thus focus on the revenues and costs under their control, and be less worried 
about costs they cannot control. 
Keywords: Efficiency, Divisionalization, Departmentalization, Corporate returns, Transfer  pricing, 
Performance measurement. 
 
1. Introduction 
The underlying cause of corporate decentralization is complexity of operations. This complexity is reflected in 
longer lines of communication, more numerous decision variables, and greater heterogeneity of products, 
processes and contributory activities. Under these conditions, several problems tend to arise in centralized 
organizations: the decision maker is removed from close contact with daily operations, leading to slower 
decisions and requiring heavy traffic communications lines; top management lacks the time to evaluate the large 
quantities of relevant data and the numerous variables that must be considered when all important decisions are 
made centrally; lower-level executives lose contact with the ultimate profit objective of the firm, and this may 
lead to inappropriate decision rules at lower levels; subordinate management tends to become specialized in the 
various functional areas, which may hinder the development of replacements for top executive positions in 
which a comprehensive viewpoint is necessary; and the employee's vision of his own importance to the 
organization tends to become obscured and morale suffers (Brown, 1969).  
Accordingly, Shillinglaw (1964), cited these problems as the reasons that many companies have turned 
to a profit-center decentralization form of operation. According to him, this quasi-independent form of 
organization forces the middle manager, the manager of the division, to sharpen his managerial skills in adopting 
a broader frame of reference. As stated by Brown (1969), it is frequently found that large decentralized firms are 
organized into separate autonomous divisions. It also frequently happens in such divisionalized firms that 
products, including raw materials, semi-finished, or finished goods, are transferred between divisions for further 
processing or for direct sale. Under these circumstances, two techniques have emerged that have especially 
facilitated the measurement of the performance of the respective divisions. One of these involves the use of some 
form of profit or rate of return on investment to directly measure performance. The other, transfer pricing, is the 
naira amount or sales price charged the sister division for goods transferred. It is the objective of this study to 
ascertain the responsiveness of corporate returns consequential to corporate divisionlisation and corporate 
decentralization. 
Every enterprise is subject to performance evaluation in some manner or form. The independent 
entrepreneur is measured in terms of customer satisfaction. Big business is measured in terms of its earnings 
reflected in the price earnings ratio of its common stock. Growth companies are measured by the growth in 
earnings per share, or growth in dividend yield by those stockholders more interested in income. Within a firm 
the most commonly used form of performance indicator is some variation of profit return or rate of return on 
assets employed (Brown, 1969). Since profit making is the paramount reason for a firm's existence, it logically 
follows that some quantitative form of profit measurement could best serve to indicate relative success or failure 
of the divisional operation. Transfer pricing as it relate to the motivation of the manager and the measure of his 
performance, is the subject of this paper. Given that the decentralized form of organization has many advantages 
and considering that it is popularly found in industry today, this study seeks to know how efficient it is on 
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corporate return with regards to the adoption of transfer pricing.  
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
Organisational structure can be classified into two main groups: decentralized and centralized structure (Drury, 
2005). An administrative organization is centralized to the extent that decisions are made at relatively high levels 
in the organization; decentralized to the extent that discretion and authority to make important decision are 
delegated by top management to lower levels of executive authority”(Simon, 1954:1). This definition relates to 
delegation of authority in making decisions with regards to the organisation. When authority is maintained at the 
top level of an organization, centralized decisions are made but when division managers are empowered to make 
autonomous decisions, it is a decentralized structure (Drury, 2005). 
According to Mintzberg and Quinn (1996: 338), “decentralisation is a diffusion of authority as regard to 
making decisions. If the responsibility of decision-making resides at the top level within the organization, it will 
be regarded as a centralized organization structure but if the responsibility of making decision is segregated 
among the lower level managers, the organization is said to be a decentralized structure. Then, this definition 
indicates that full decentralized system and centralized system are actually not feasible in practical terms, it is 
just a matter of degree. Horngren (1982: 630) alleged that complete centralization structure is not cost-effective 
at most times and it is virtually not practicable to handle all decisions at the top management levels.  
According to Nathanson and Galbraith (1978:5) “a structure is defined as the segmentation of work into 
roles such as production, finance, marketing, and so on; the recombining of roles into departments or divisions 
around functions, products, regions, or markets; and the distribution of power across this structure”. This 
therefore implies that an organization structure can be divisional or functional. Functional structure includes 
distinct area of functions/activities such production, finance and marketing and the functional heads report to the 
managing director directly, (Drury 2005).  
A divisionalized/departmentalized structure however involves the establishment of independent units 
based on specific product line or location or customer preferences in which a central management supervise the 
activities of all the divisions. A typical type of this structure results in decentralization in decision making 
process. The divisional heads/managers are permitted to set their selling prices and choose the market to trade as 
well as select their various suppliers which include supplies from other divisions of the organization; whereas in 
functional structure, top level management preside on decisions such as product mix, structure pricing and output 
quantities/ qualities 
As pointed out in the introduction, the transfer price is the value placed on goods produced by one 
division of a multi-division industrial complex and then transferred to another division of the same firm for 
additional processing or for sale. The transfer price thereby becomes a significant single variable in determining 
the shipping and receiving division’s relative profit, their performance measure and consequently, to a large 
degree, the motivation of the managers involved. It may also have an influence on management decisions 
concerning make or buy, selecting production possibilities and possibly whether to keep producing at all.  
Brown (1969), opined that transfer price policies must neither impinge unduly on executive time nor 
interfere with overall company goals. He added, motivation is the overriding consideration that should influence 
management in using performance measures. 
There are many methods in active use for determining a transfer price. For each method the advantages 
and disadvantages exist to determine the probable effect of the method on the motivation of the manager, and to 
determine its effect on the rate of return as an indicator of performance.  
Brown (1969), sees a divisionalized firm as one that is split up into product or regional divisions, each 
of which has full responsibility for its own profit or loss. Essential in this arrangement is that all the major 
operations necessary to make a profit are grouped under the manager of each self-sufficient unit. Further, the 
management of these units are so highly decentralized that each of them is semi-autonomous. The system 
operates as a network of little businesses within the parent firm. The manager has most of the resources and 
much of the freedom of action that he would enjoy if he were president of an independent company. He, in turn, 
is expected to take whatever steps necessary to make a profit. Most diversified companies use some variation of 
this form of divisionalized organization. A major advantage of profit decentralization is its effect on the 
motivation of the division manager and his top level supervisors. They can make key decisions concerning their 
division and subsequently see the results of their efforts. The profit-and-loss statement of each operating division 
provides a significant measure of results since all the relevant activities are under the direction of the division 
manager.  
In a divisionalized firm, as in all other types of business, it is desirable to have a means for motivating 
those responsible for the management of the division in a direction that is to the overall benefit of the firm. It is 
also desirable to have a system whereby the resulting performance of those managers can be measured in terms 
that express the managers' contribution to the goals of the firm. Various indicators have been suggested and used 
to accomplish these ends, but the more meaningful, at least for a profit oriented firm, include some form of profit 
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measurement. The more common forms of measurement include profit contribution, return on investment or 
residual income. Applying these measures in divisions that sell exclusively to outside markets is relatively 
simple. Sales or transfers between divisions however raise the question of equitable distribution of the total profit 
between the divisions involved. The relative distribution among divisions is most important to the division 
managers since it will, in divisions that so transfer a significant portion of their production, largely determine 
their profit and consequently their performance measure by higher management. 
Internal transfer prices are an important factor in performance evaluation. This is painfully obvious to 
the division manager whose performance is being measured and who might be the victim of an arbitrarily 
established transfer price that favors the sister division. Several methods may be used to establish the price used 
to account for internal transfers. The selection of an appropriate method depends at least in part on management's 
objectives in using such prices and partly on the merits of the different pricing schemes.  
Transfer pricing methods enumerated by Brown (1969) include: 
i. Market price method 
The market price method involves transfer of goods at a value or price equivalent to that prevailing in the open 
market. It is the price that the receiving division would have to pay outsiders. It is an opportunity cost. It is a 
price that would be obtained through arm's length bargaining between the receiving division and an outside 
supplier. 
The market price method is difficult to challenge. It enables the divisions to operate almost as though 
they were completely separate entities except for the guiding hand of top management that can be brought to 
bear should a division manager make irrational decisions that would adversely affect the overall corporate goals. 
The motivational incentives of this type of virtually independent operation can, perhaps, only be exceeded by 
that provided by a completely independent firm.  
The yardstick for measuring the manager's performance, his profit contribution to the overall 
profitability of the firm, closely parallels that for an independent firm. The method facilitates the division 
managers retaining full profit responsibility for their divisions. It appears, then, that the market price method 
fully contributes to the motivation of management and fully supports performance measurement requirements of 
the divisionalized firm.  
ii.      Least price method 
The least price method of intracompany transfer price determination is nothing more than the market price 
method. It involves using the same prices for trade and intracompany sales. This method is seen as the most 
defensible basis of intracompany pricing. In this method, the buyer is paying prices which are just as low as 
those charged to favored customers. The seller receives the same income that he would receive if he sold the 
same products to outside customers. Further, the buyer pays price which are at least as low as he would pay if he 
bought the products in the open market.  
iii.       Base-period cost plus profit method 
This method utilizes cost and capital employed at a given moment in time, but not necessarily coincident with 
the accounting period. Profit is based on a pre-established percentage of the base period cost. Changes to costs, 
prices of raw materials, or wage and salary rates may be the cause for adjustment of the transfer price and may 
therefore be passed on to the receiving division.  
One disadvantage of this method is that, gains or losses due to production methods or efficiencies are 
realized by the producer at least until the base-period cost base is revised. Hence, the divisional manager’s profit 
is not guaranteed. Yet, on the other hand, he can make expenditures for cost reduction items or affect other 
efficiencies to increase his profit without passing any part of these savings along to the buying division.  
Another disadvantage of this method is that the producer can load the costs or value of capital employed 
at the time the transfer price is established, thus giving himself easily attainable excess profits and putting the 
buyer at a competitive disadvantage. With the exception of short run efficiencies or savings for which the 
producing unit can take credit, motivation of each division manager to expand his profit will be at the expense of 
the sister division. Also, the producing division manager would not be motivated to lower costs under his control 
since his performance is not measured by this yardstick. In short, this method provides neither a sound profit 
performance measure nor a positive motivational force.  
iv.  Budgeted cost plus profit method 
The budgeted cost plus profit method, sometimes called cost plus a markup method, bases the transfer price on 
the budgeted cost of the seller plus a predetermined rate of return. The profit percentage is set by company 
policy. It is normally based on average rate of return of the buying unit, the firm as a whole, or on some fixed 
rate such as a predetermined return on capital invested. The budgeted cost plus profit method utilizes the 
accounting period to determine costs rather than using values that exist at some given time as under the base 
period method. This method provides little incentive for the producing unit other than meeting its own cost 
standards and fixed expense budgets since the rate of profit is guaranteed and the volume is determined by the 
buyer.  
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There is little motivational influence to become efficient. In fact, the seller may be inefficient, he may 
be operating at a low fraction of capacity, or his cost records may be padded. Since these costs, as improper as 
they may be, are passed along to the buyer along with any permanent increases in material, labor, and other costs, 
there is little incentive for the seller to minimize them. In fact, higher costs will yield higher apparent profits for 
the producing division since profits are a percentage of cost. The higher profit would be at the expense of the 
buyer and subsequently the customer in the market place.  
Conversely, since cost savings would yield lower total profit there is little hope for innovation under 
such a method. As in the previously discussed method, since profit is computed on a fixed percentage of cost, 
top management obviously cannot use profit as a performance measure. Particularly since profit is directly 
proportionate to costs, any form of profit measurement would serve to negatively motivate division managers 
into increasing costs, or at least influence him not to decrease them. Obviously, lower costs combined with other 
factors serve as value indicators of performance under this system. This in turn would promote innovation, 
efficiency and other efforts toward cost reduction and, consequently, greater total profit for the firm. It would, 
however, and then be a cost method form of transfer price similar perhaps to the following:  
a.  Absorption cost method 
The absorption cost method is similar to the aforementioned budgeted cost plus profit method, except in its 
detailed accounting techniques and its exclusion of a profit markup. The method has the minor advantage of 
being readily usable for external reporting of inventories since profits are excluded.  
The disadvantages are numerous. The revenue potential of the products being transferred is not reflected. 
Consequently, the income of the supplying division will be understated at best, and nearly non-existent if a 
significant portion of his output is so transferred. Conversely, the receiving unit’s potential profit will be 
abnormally high. The selling division's performance cannot be measured by its profit or rate of return since the 
proportion of its total output that is transferred to the sister division, at no profit, may vary from period to period. 
The profit could thus be uncomparable with other similar industries or with previous years for the division.  
b.  Factory cost method  
The factory cost method is nearly identical to the absorption cost method. It is normally used when there are no 
requirements for performance or profit measurement by the units concerned. If standard costs are used, transfers 
are made at the standard cost with variances being charged to the producing unit. If standards have not yet been 
developed, actual costs are frequently used as a transfer price. The use of actual costs may result in inefficiencies 
being passed along to the buyer, a constant cause of disagreement between the divisions. However, if costs were 
also used as a basis for performance measurement of the producer, it would negate the problem somewhat and 
provide the motivation necessary to minimize costs to the benefit of the producer, the receiver and the firm 
overall. Profit can be used to measure performance of the receiving unit, but only to the degree as was discussed 
in the absorption cost method. Use of factory cost as a transfer price can upset the profit and performance 
measurement of subsequent units in the chain.  
c.  Variable cost method 
The variable cost method utilizes the variable cost of the producing unit as a transfer price. To this, the receiving 
division adds its variable cost to establish a minimum selling cost. The ultimate selling price establishes the 
marginal contribution for the combined divisions. As can readily be seen, the method is grossly unfair to the 
producing unit as it affects its profit performance indicator.  
The goods so transferred not only do not provide any increment of profit, but they even fail to provide a 
contribution toward the fixed costs of the producer. Unless an extremely small proportion of his total output is so 
transferred, profit return is not a valid performance indicator.  
v. Negotiated price method 
As the name implies, the negotiated price method involves negotiation between the buying and selling units to 
determine an equitable transfer price, Keller and Ferrara (1957), in the application of this method say, “in the 
absence of published list prices , negotiation results in the most equitable intracompany prices." It should be 
noted that their description of list price is identical to the definition and use of market price.  
Perhaps the negotiated price method is the most equitable in the absence of a market price. Nevertheless, 
it does have certain drawbacks. For example, either the buyer or seller may bargain from a more advantageous 
position. One may have outside market flexibility while the other may not. Whatever the reason, the agreed price 
may be unfavorable to the weaker division, adversely affecting both its long range performance measure and 
certainly its motivation. This method may divert attention away from the overall firm to the individual division's 
welfare.  
In consideration of the disadvantages, Horngren's (1982) conclusion is in sharp contrast with that 
credited earlier to Keller and Ferrara (1957). He concluded that when market prices are not available as a 
foundation for negotiations, the resultant transfer prices are artificial to a point which severely limits the 
significance of rate of return or other measures of performance. This reminds us of the whole idea of 
decentralization and of profit centers that is based on the freedom and independence of the division managers. 
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2.2 Theoretical framework 
As opined by Dawson and Miller (2000), decision-making by the central management does not really 
characterize the operation of multinational organisations, top management however do delegate to 
divisional/departmental managements some degree of authority in decision-making, while holding other 
decisions. Decentralization describes the diffusion of authority in decision-making with regards to large firms or 
multinational corporations. It provides a framework for a meaningful assessment of the principal-agent 
relationship between the central management and divisional managements.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
The framework of Agency-theory brings about the decentralization model. As opined by Dawson and Miller 
(2000), division and department general managements maximize their profits because it has effect on their 
compensation. Decentralized decision-making and control assumption allow an analysis of comparability with 
respect to transferred prices. This model identifies the volume of intra-firm buying and selling that depend on 
transfer price. The comparative effect supports the intuitive knowledge of the correlation between the rate of tax 
and transfer price. When the rates of tax are different, the transfer price moves profit from the division with high 
tax to the division that is low taxed so as to maximize the corporate’s after tax profit with subject to a 
constriction of an effectual arm’s-length transaction (Dawson & Miller, 2000). They further stated that the 
optimal price of transfer could be a centralized resolution rather than pricing of an arm’s-length. However, to 
minimize the burden of tax, multinational organisations might carry out necessary adjustments on their transfer 
pricings to a price outside the range of arm’s length. 
2.2.2 Profit Maximization and Transfer pricing 
Profit can be maximized especially in a situation where market based transfer pricing method is adopted. In this 
method, the transfer price is matched to the existing market value of such product by the selling division. By 
using this approach, the company as a whole can achieve the following:   
Profit Centre system: when the prevailing market price is used, a division can earn profit on its selling 
activities both externally and internally. For this to be achievable, management should adopt responsibility 
accounting through profit Centre’s so as to evaluate the performance of each division. 
Profit Maximization: for overall corporate profit to be maximised, the selling division can generate 
enough profit by selling virtually all its products at transfer price internally just as it can externally. There should 
be no need for selling at a transfer price which is extremely low in an internal transaction when an arm’s length 
transaction could have resulted in achieving a more profitability level. 
Simplified sources of information: information on current market prices are easy to get. It can be 
sourced from price sheet regulation, stock exchange market quoted and posted price. These can be applied to all 
sales directly whether it be internal or external as no complexity is required in calculation of selling prices and 
negotiations and bargaining politics are reduced to the minimum.  
Arm length transactions: Market transfer pricing encourages both the selling and buying divisions to 
take decisions on their sources of supply and final market for their products; not withstanding if the source or 
final market is within the same entity or not. This minimises wrong perceptions to market behavioural patterns 
which is encouraged by other transfer pricing methods.  
However, the limiting factor to the use of market based transfer price exists as market might not be 
always available for such products as intermediate goods especially for specialized components, parts, materials 
or services. When a situation as such occurred, it may be difficult to obtain appropriate market price.  
Another challenge to the use of market pricing method is that even when market does exist for a 
product, it may not be perfectly competitive, which invariably means that market is affected by the pricing 
decisions of each divisional managers. It should be noted that the selling division will always have a choice to 
sell its products externally and when internal transfer pricing seems not favourable, the selling unit can be driven 
to sell its products externally. This can lead to sub-optimality among divisions which can impair on the 
organisation overall objectives. 
 
2.3 Empirical Framework 
In the work of Bouwens and VanLent (2006), it was discovered that in most cases, profits, (accounting returns) 
are used as parameter of measurement when divisional managers enjoy autonomy in decision making. Some 
writers maintain that the use of  profit and accounting returns as measurement basis will only be meaningful if a 
division manager has substantial decision-making authority/power. These opinions are often conveyed whenever 
the use of responsibility centers and responsibility accounting are discussed. “A common misconception is the 
term profit center which is synonymous to a decentralized subunit. Managers, in a division organized as a profit 
center, may have little leeway in making decisions” (Horngren, Foster & Datar 1994: 863) 
According to Kaplan and Atkinson (1989: 590), “the major reason for the usage of profit centre  is to 
enhance initiative in respect to decision making by the head of various divisions. They added that “a profit center 
is a unit for which the manager has the authority to make decisions on sources of supply and choice of markets.”  
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Burlingame (1967), concluded that decentralization and the middle manager are much more likely to 
grow and flourish than to wither and die in the decades ahead. According to Brown (1969), decentralization of 
decision- making provides a climate of individual responsibility, authority, and dignity which encourages the 
growth and development of creative talents and which in turn, results in great improvement in the firm both in 
monetary terms (increased corporate returns) and non-monetary value (quality decision making). 
 
3 Methodology  
The research adopted survey design method. The population of this study comprised all the commercial banks in 
Nigeria. In this study, the sampling frame comprised of senior and junior staff in the relevant departments of the 
banks. The banking sector was purposively selected while the bank staff were randomly selected. 
The questionnaire was structured using five-point Likert scales ranging from 1-5. Data collected were 
presented using tables and hypothetically tested using regression analytical tool.  
The model specification of the study includes: 
CORPR1 = B0 + TPDD X1 
Where:  
B0=   Intercept 
CORPR= Corporate returns  
TPDD =  Transfer pricing in departmentalization and divizionalization 
X1=   Parameter 
 
4.0 Results  
Information gotten from the respondents are presented to establish the relationship between transfer pricing in 
divisionalization/departmentalization and corporate returns in Nigerian companies. The results of this correlation 
are presented in tables 1 - 4 
Table 1 establishes a profound relationship between the correlated data of transfer pricing in 
divisions/departments and corporate returns in Nigerian companies. This was evidentially presented between 
division’s autonomy in Transfer pricing and (tcal =.332 > Pvalue =0.05) increase in profitability. A similar trend 
was seen between sub optimaility in transfer pricing among divisions/departments (tcal =.248 > Pvalue =0.05)  
and divisional efficiency. These results show a positive correlation between both variables. However, the reverse 
was the case when sub- optimality in transfer pricing among divisions/departments was correlated (tcal =.089 > 
Pvalue =0.05) with increased profitability as a proxy to corporate returns. This was positive but not significantly 
correlated.  
Using data from the table 4, the t-statistics shows a positive and significant relationship between 
transfer pricing in-between divisions/departments and corporate returns. The t-value of 2.723 was predominantly 
high and greater than the cutoff point of 1.97 coupled with the R2 value of about (.101) which means that 10% of 
the variation in the intentions of corporate returns of Nigeria companies can be explained by transfer pricing 
between divisions and departments of the company; while the overall relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables were significant with a F-value of 7.413.  
 
4.1 Discussion of findings,  
The study evaluates the efficiency of divisionalization and departmentalization on corporate returns with regards 
to transfer pricing in Nigerian companies. The result from the empirical evaluation established that transfer 
pricing in divisionalization and departmentalization contributes to corporate returns in Nigerian companies.  
From the findings, it is established that division autonomy should be maintained to maximize efficient 
transfer pricing method among the division for both divisional profit and overall corporate returns to be 
enhanced, this is to ensure that the profit of one division is not dependent on the action of another division. 
Divisional efficiency is another factor that contributes to profit maximization of the individual division 
and the whole organization. Efficiency could be in terms of minimizing costs, maximizing profits and 
proficiency in investment decisions which tend towards promoting the goal congruence of the organization even 
as to the benefit of each division. 
In addition, each division ensures effective transfer pricing, by ensuring efficiency in their productivity, 
selects carefully the sources of supply and choice of markets and having a strong bargaining power for their 
product. This ensures that the contribution of each division to corporate returns/profit is not distorted by the 
selected transfer pricing method. 
Transfer prices are found to relate to performance measurements in that they affect and establish a 
ceiling on the amount of profit or markup a division is able to generate on its product. 
It should also be noted from the findings that sub-optmality decisions should be avoided by division 
managers as such decisions might though increase the financial performance of the division could be at the 
expense of the entire organization. 
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5 Conclusion 
Divisionalization encourages managers to be profit responsible as well as encourages responsibility for revenue 
generation, cost control and earning substantial returns on  investment. Howbeit, transfer pricing approach of 
suboptimal decision could bring about a dwindling result where sub optimality could amount to divisional 
efficiency but might truncate the organization’s ability to achieve increased profit in the interim as the case may 
be. An organisation therefore must set transfer prices at a pricing level that will ensure highest returns  not only 
at divisional level but for the overall organization as it is possible for a division to generate maximum profit 
while overall corporate entity may not due to sub-optimality. 
 
6 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, the study recommends that: 
 Prices should be set to maintain satisfactory division autonomy so that the advantages of 
divisionalization which include but not limited to motivation, better decision making and improved 
initiatives are maintained.  
 Decisions about selling prices including transfer prices and output levels should be within the permit of 
divisional managers so as to ensure maximization of profits among the divisionalized units as this will 
enhance the overall corporate returns of the company.   
 Transfer price should be set in such a way that the divisional management’s aim to maximize divisional 
profit is in line with the objectives of the company as a whole; while the profits drive of one 
division/department should not be affected by actions of another division; and companies should ensure 
divisional managers focus on maximizing controllable profit by concentrating on those costs and 
revenues within their control power, and be less concerned with the costs beyond their control power. 
 For overall Corporate returns to be enhanced by transfer pricing, it is recommended that companies 
should set prices based on adequate balance of overall firm’s profitability goals. Market transfer pricing 
(prices at the prevailing market price) should however be encouraged among the divisions and 
departments of the organization for adequate performance measures and motivation in respect of 
profitability.  
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Table 1 
Correlation between transfer pricing in divisionalization/departmentalization and corporate returns 
 
Divisional 
Autino Subuptim_Decion Division_Efiicie Increase_pro 
Divisional_Autino Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .180 .154 .332** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .143 .209 .006 
N 68 68 68 68 
Subuptim_Decion Pearson 
Correlation 
.180 1 .248* .089 
Sig. (2-tailed) .143  .042 .468 
N 68 68 68 68 
Division_Efiicie Pearson 
Correlation 
.154 .248* 1 .469** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .209 .042  .000 
N 68 68 68 68 
Increase_pro Pearson 
Correlation 
.332** .089 .469** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .468 .000  
N 68 68 68 68 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: SPSS OUTPUT, 2015 
 
Table 2:  Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
dimension0 1 .318a .101 .087 1.74678 
a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00008 
 
Table 3 ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.619 1 22.619 7.413 .008a 
Residual 201.381 66 3.051   
Total 224.000 67    
a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00008 
b. Dependent Variable: VAR00003 
 
Table 4 Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.589 .560  8.198 .000 
VAR00008 .260 .095 .318 2.723 .008 
a. Dependent Variable: VAR00003 
 
 
